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Article 11

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
LANDLORD AND TENANT-RELEASE OF TENANT-Appellant, on September
21, 1921, leased the premises in question to appellee Niezer & Co., for a
period of three years, with the right of renewal for two additional years.
The lease provided that "at the expiration of this lease peaceable possession
of the premises shall be given to said first party in as good condition as
they now are." The original lease to Niezer & Co. provided that the
lessee should have no right to sublet; but later by separate written contract
this provision was abrogated. Thereafter the right of renewal was exercised and on the same day Niezer & Co. transferred the premises to appellee Frank E. Oddou for the remainder of the term covered by the company's
lease and delivered to Oddou the written lease it then held, although there
was no written assignment of the lease, and no written contract between
them. The rent was paid to appellant by Niezer & Co., November, 1924,
after which time and until the expiration of the lease, Sept. 21, 1926, the
rent was paid by Oddou directly to appellant. Three months before the
expiration of the lease, appellant notified Niezer & Co. to deliver possession
to him upon the expiration, and at the latter time made demand of Niezer &
Co. and Oddou for possession which was refused. Appellant began this suit
for possession and damages against Oddou and later by amended complaint
made Niezer & Co. a party defendant, setting up the latter's agreement to
return the premises in good condition at the expiration of the lease, its
failure, and the consequent damage to appellant. Both appellees answered
the complaint by a denial and Niezer & Co. also set up that they were
released by an implied contract, in November, 1924, by appellant, who
agreed at that time to look solely to Oddou as lessee of the premises. In
support of this defense Niezer & Co. testified that after the property had
been transferred to Oddou, appellant came to them to collect the rent and
while there stated that he wanted to collect the rent directly and relieve
them of all transactions in that regard. The trial resulted in a finding and
judgment for appellant against Oddou and a judgment in favor of Niezer
& Co. This appeal followed. Held: Reversed, with instructions to grant
a new trial. Klein v. Niezer & Co. et al., App. Ct. Ind., January 29, 1930,
169 N. E. 688.
The transaction between Niezer & Co. and Oddou constituted an assignment, since the entire interest of Niezer & Co. was transferred, the latter
having no reversion, and the rent payable remaining the same. The statute
of frauds is not operative since the assignment, though oral, was of a term
for two years only. Tiffany's Landlord and Tenant, Vol. 1, Par. 151, Burns'
Ann. St. 1926, Sec. 8045. It is generally established that the lessee, who
before his assignment of the lease to a third person is bound by both the
express and the implied covenants of the lease, continues after the assignment to be liable upon his express covenants therein, as if no assignment
had been made, and that the assignee is liable to the lessor upon all the
covenants which run with the land, for non-performance thereof while the
estate is in him, the liability of the lessee after his assignment resting
in privity of contract, and that of the assignee resting in privity of estate
and continuing only while such privity exists. Heller v. Dailey et al., 28
Ind. App. 555; Edmonds v. Mounsey, 15 Ind. App. 399; Breeenridge .
Parrott,15 Ind. App. 411; Keith v. McGregor, 259 S. W. 725, 163 Ark. 203;
5 Elliott Contract, Par. 4574. Upon such assignment, although the assignee
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becomes liable upon the express covenants of the lessee which touch and
concern the land, the lessee remains liable on such covenants as well as on
others for the reason that one who has subjected himself to a contractual
liability cannot divest himself thereof by his own act. Jordan v. Indianapolis Water Co., 159 Ind. 337, 64 N. E. 680; Rector v. Hartford Deposit
Co., 191 Ill. 380, 60 N. E. 528; Powell v. Jones, 50 Ind. App. 493, 98 N. E.
646; Winenman v.Phillips, 93 Mich. 223, 53 N. W. 168; Tiffany, Landlord
and Tenant, Par. 157. The covenant to give over possession of the premises at the expiration of the lease "in as good condition as they now are"
being an express covenant, both lessee and assignee are therefore liable
thereon, unless the lessees were relieved from liability by release as they
claim. It is not controverted that there is no express contract of release,
and it is well established that an implied contract grows out of the intention
of the parties, and that there must be a meeting of the minds. Western
Oil Refining Co. v. Underwood, 83 Ind. App. 488, 149 N. E. 85; Boyd P.
Chase, 89 Ind. App. -, 166 N. E. 611; Irwin v. Jones, 46 Ind. App. 588, 92
N. E. 787. The evidence does not support the claim of an implied contract
of release since no consideration for the alleged release is shown, and it
appears that the appellant did not know of the assignment until November, approximately four months after Oddou had taken possession, when
the conversation in reference to the payment of rent is said to have taken
place. It was not necessary for appellant to give the notice to quit since
where the time is definite and certain in a lease, it will expire by limitation,
and no notice to quit is necessary; Barrett v.Johnson, 27 N. E. 983, 2 Ind.
App. 25; Mason v. Kempf, 38 N. E. 230, 11 Ind. App. 311; Millington V.
O'Dell, 73 N. E. 949, 35 Ind. App. 225; but the fact that said notice was
sent, and sent to Niezer & Co., is another circumstance showing that there
was no meeting of the minds of the parties on a contract to release Niezer
& Co.
K.J. M.
MASTER AND SERVANT--"'SIMPLE TooL" RuLE-AssUMPTION OF RIsKPlaintiff sued under the Federal Employer's Liability Act to recover damages for the loss of an eye, caused by defendant's alleged negligence. Plaintiff, 56 years old, was employed as defendant's section hand, and had
worked 18 months prior to the injury. One of his duties was to remove
old ties and replace them with new ones. For this purpose, plaintiff was
supplied with picks, claw bars, and crowbars. At the time of the accident,
one E was working with plaintiff and using a crowbar, plaintiff using a
pick. Plaintiff stood outside the rail where he could stick the pick in the
end of the tie and, by pulling on the pick handle, aid in removing the tie.
He missed the place in the tie at which he aimed and struck the ball of
the rail with the point of the pick. When the point of the pick hit the
rail, a chip from the point was dislodged, flew up and hit him in the eye,
blinding it. Plaintiff knew, at the time of the accident, that the point of
the pick was dull, that the handle was crooked, and that the head of the
pick was loose in the handle. Three other section hands testified, as did
plaintiff, that they had at various times made complaints to the foreman of
these defects in the tools, and that the foreman had said that new tools
had been ordered and would arrive soon. Plaintiff was very vague and
indefinite as to when these conversations with the foreman had taken place.

